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Over the last two centuries, almost all western countries have 
experienced large declines in fertility: the rate at which their female 
populations bear children. The decline has been more.or less continuous; 
it has often seemed irreversible. Little.of the world outside Europe and 
c. the areas settled mainly by Europeans has experienced the massive, 
I continuous decline of fertility. During the same period, the same Europe- 
-% 
centered world has undergone industrialization and urbanization to a 
degree almost unparalleled'elsewhere. 
The fertility decline, the industrialization and the urbanization 
- have accompanied each other closely enough to encourage the idea that 
, industrialization and urbanization cause fertility to decline. We have 
plenty of ideas to make such a\relationship plausible: the idea that 
urban-industrial families have less need.and less desire for the labor 
of children than agrarian families do, the idea that contraceptive 
techniques and information improve as a consequence of advances in 
communication and in scientific knowledge resulting from industrialization, 
and so on. In.fact, the problem is that we have too many explanations 
which are.individually plausible in general terms, which contradict each 
other to some degree, and which fail to fit some significant part of the 
facts. 
One recent look at the prospects for a worldwide fertility decline 
ran : 
Negotiating a transit from high fertility to low fertility 
levels could prove easier for today's underdeveloped countries, 
some of which required over half a century to move from f~irly 
high to low levels . . . Today contraceptive methods are far 
more advanced, often have the active endorsement of the state, 
, . 
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and are strongly opposed by cults and'ideological groups only 
in some countries. Moreover, high fertility combines with low 
infant.and child mortality to impose a.heavier dependency bur- 
den on adults than was the case in the West in the nineteenth 
century, when children required 1ess.education and entered the 
labor force earlier; Urbanization also feeds the.revolutionary 
change in man's aspirations now underway-in much of the world 
(Spengler 1974: 17;. the omitted material .shows that fertility 
levels in the poor parts of today's world are higher than they 
were in most European countries when those countries began their 
nineteenth-century fertility decline). 
Now, this statement deals with opportunities..rather than established 
regularities. Nevertheless, its plausibility rests on a series of causal 
arguments: 1) that the efficiency of available contraceptive technology, 
the moral ' and political support for contraception and the extent of 
dependency all accelerate the decline of fer.tility, 2) that the worldwide 
It change in. man ' s aspirationst' reduces. people ' s desire or' willingness to 
have many children, 3) that these changes in goals and in the means avail- 
able to the'goals are the chief factors in the decline of fertility. In 
such an argument, urbanization and industrialization affect fertility through 
their impacts on general aspirations, attitudes toward children, burdens of 
dependency and contraceptive technology. 
I> ' The connections are plausible. Yet in the present state of knowledge 
it is debatable whether the connections are strong or consistent. It is 
debatable whether they are the chief connections between urbanization and 
industrialization, on the.one hand, and fertility change, on the other. In 
a recent authoritative collection of essays on fertility and family plan- 
ning, Simon Kuznets speaks of the "insensitivity of fertility levels to 
wide differences in economic and social factors despite the-marked contrast . 
L.7 between the [less developed] and [more developed] groups, each taken as a 
whole, with respect to both social factors and fertility", while Ansley 
Y 
Cole concludes: 
Perhaps we shall through a stroke of insight or good fortune 
discover a grand generalization that will provide a compact and 
widely valid explanation of the decline of marital fertility in 
Europe. But at the moment it appears that the process was more 
complex, subtle, and diverse than anticipated; only an optimist 
would still .expect a simple account of why fertility fell 
(Behrman, Corsa and Freedman 1969: 159-160, 19). 
Both in accounting for the contemporary distribution of high and low 
fertility in the world and in accounting for the pattern by which fertility 
fell in the West, then, we have a surfeit of interesting partial hypotheses 
and a dearth of successful general formulations. 
In this book, we look hard at some portions of the western experience. 
By studying particular experiences closely, we hope to get a sense of the 
actual process by which fertility changed and to.start ruling out a few of 
the available hypotheses. By turning to historical material, we hope to 
find rich, continuous documentation over the substantial blocks of.time 
I- which major fertility changes require. By being explicit and punctilious 
about the models and methods we employ, we hope to link what we learn about 
particular experiences in Europe or North America both with comparable 
experiences elsewhere and with general arguments -- other people's and our 
own. The book contains a series of general arguments, a number of 
historical illustrations of the arguments, a body of systematic evidence 
drawn from the historical experience of western Europe, and a smaller body 
of evidence from the United States. Each of the elements is incomplete. 
Nor do all of them fit together perfectly. 
The purpose of this first essay is to provide a context for the other 
papers, to specify some of the ways in which they are incomplete, and to 
identify some points of contact among them. It is sweeping and speculative 
where they are prudent and precise. The purpose is still the same: to 
make connections between western historical experience and alternative 
general ideas about the determinants of changes in fertility. 
Vital Processes and Collective Biography 
The basic vital processes are fertility and mortality: the beginning 
and ending of life. Vital statisticians center their attention on fertility 
and mortality. They cannot, however, avoid dealing with three other funda-. 
mental demographic processes: migration, social mobility and nuptiality. 
Migration enters into analyses of fertility and mortality because the 
movement of people into or out of a locality affects the liability of the 
population to pregnancy and its liability to death. Social mobility -- 
that is, the movement of people from category to category rather than place 
to place -- similarly affects who is at risk to pregnancy or to death in 
any particular category; furthermore, since categories of people vary in 
their propensity to family planning, in their access to medical services, 
and in many other regards which affect their fertility and mortality, a 
large shift of people from one category to another sometimes alters the 
vital characteristics of the population as a whole. Nuptiality -- the 
movement of people into and out of marriage--significantly affects fertility, 
since the great bulk of human conception, and an even greater share of human 
childbearing, takes place within marrlages. 
Mortality, nuptiality and fertility form a kind of hierarchy. The 
existing level and pattern of mortality set limits on who can marry, at what 
ages. They also affect the numbers and age distribution of women in the 
childbearing ages. The level and pattern of nuptiality set limits (not so 
stringent as in the case of mortality) on the portion of the female popula- 
tion likely to bear children; Over the long run the pattern of fertility 
helps determine who is there to marry or die. There may also be an effect 
of nuptiality on mortality because marriage somehow affects.one's life 
expectancy. But in general nuptiality constrains fertility, while mortality 
constrains both nuptiality and fertility. Thus the main relationships which 
interest us are: 
MORTALITY, 
Other variables affect.the core set. I have already mentioned migra- 
tion .and social mobility. Non-demographic variables also matter. For 
example,.over the range of human history, the relative abundance of food 
has significantly affected the.rates at which people have died, married and 
borne children. Despite the situation in the contemporary world (in which 
1 
food-poor countries have high mortality, but also have high fertility and 
appear to have high nuptiality as well), the main historical tendency has 
probably been for food shortage to raise mortality, and to.depress nuptiality 
and fertility. Again, the urbanization of a population seems to affect the 
patterns of birth, death and marriage alike. 
Births, deaths and marriages,are events happening to individuals, while 
fertility, mortality and nuptiality are the resultants of those individual 
;- 
events at the level of a population. At the indi.vidua1 level we have the 
number of children ever born to a particular woman or .the age at death of a 
particular man. At,the level of the population we have a total fertility 
rate or an expectation of life at birth. The neat thing about the demo- 
graphic analysis of vital phenomena, in fact, is that it us to deal 
with the individual and the group at the same time: first, by.specifying 
the-logic by.which the one is aggregated into the other; second; by permit- 
. ting us to compare the experience of any particular individual with that of 
the population to.which the individual belongs. 
Because of the.explicitness and precision with' which demographic 
analysis performs this aggregation and-disaggregation.of events, it provides 
an interesting model for a wide range of historical investigations. Histo- 
rians who really want to talk about groups often find themselves surrounded 
by information..about individuals. They have several standard ways of jumping 
the gap:. by concentrating on spokesmen, leaders or elites within the 
population at hand, by pulling out "typical" individuals, by relying on the 
testimony of expert observers of the groups in question, by reporting and 
illustrating general impressions from long contact with individual records. 
Recently, the effort called "collective biography" has offered a more 
systematic alternative. Collective biography consists of recording features 
of the life histories of considerable numbers of individuals in a uniform 
fashion, then aggregating the individual records into a collective portrait 
of the group and its structure. The collective portrait may consist mainly 
of averages: mean income, moves per year, median size of a household. It 
may consist of measures for which there is no precise individual counter- 
part: income inequality, net reproduction rate, proportion of the labor 
force in agriculture. It .may involve the sorting of the population into 
its major subdivisions: old vs. young,.rich vs. poor, rural vs. urban. It 
may even reconstruct the relationships among individuals-, for example by 
- 
placing them within their distinct lineages. As .the population under study--. 
becomes large,.the portrait almost necessarily becomes quantitative. It 
also becomes more'and.more advantageous to let-a computer.do the. collating 
and counting. In.genera1, the payoff from collective biography--as.compared 
with other ways of drawing general conclusions from multiple human experi- 
-\-/---. 
ences--rises as the number of persons increases, aKtLe different records 
containing information about the same individual multiply, and as the 
general arguments being made are explicit and precise. 
At first view, collective biography seems like a very inductive pro- 
cedure: plug in the individuals and watch the patterns emerge. In fact, 
collective biography has proven most valuable to historians where someone 
has already developed an explicit and interesting model of the phenomenon 
under examination. 
The historical'study of social stratification and mobility is a good 
example.. In that field, scholars disagree vehemently about the appropriate 
models, but they commonly work with explicit models of social hierarchies 
and of movement within the hierarchies. As ,a consequence, we have (among 
other things) a series of roughly comparable analyses of American,cities 
which contradict the idea of a great expansion of opportunity in the 
twentieth century, yet establish both the abundance of minor movements up 
and down. the social scale and the rarity of movements from rags to riches 
\ 
or riches to rags. Other versions of collective biography have yielded 
interesting results in the historical study of elites, elections, legisla- 
tive behavior and political conflict. 
Historical Demography 
The-most resounding results, however, have come from historical demo- 
graphy. The discipline of demography.began to take shape in the eighteenth 
century as a way of analyzing.historica1 changes in population sizes and 
characteristics. Yet by the 1930s the discipline had become largely ahisto- 
rical in its concerns and its.procedures. After World War I1 demography 
moved back toward its historica1,origins. The increasing desire to compare 
the current demographic experience of non-western countries with the past 
experience of the West promoted historical studies. The rising interest in 
identifying the demographic components or counterparts of the processes 
vaguely and optimistically called "development" augmented, the possible return 
from studying long, well-documented historical population changes. And a 
series of technical innovations in.demography and history made.the demogra- 
phic analysis of historical materials increasingly feasible and profitable. 
The innovations included the refinement of stable population models, the 
elaboration of procedures for making demographic estimates from incomplete 
data and the development of computer routines for the collation of large 
numbers of observations. They emphatically included the introduction of 
collective biography. 
Two new practices brought collective biography to the center of 
historical demography. Both owed a good deal to the French demographer 
Louis Henry. The first was the use of genealogies to produce demographic 
estimates for whole populations. The second was the application of essen- 
tially the same procedures as had been used to analyze genealogies in the 
construction of demographic estimates from historical records of births, - 
marriages and deaths. In Henry's version of "family reconstitution," the 
investigator cumulated individual registrations of vital events into dossiers 
which related the members of a nuclear family to each other and grouped 
together the scattered references to the same individual. For families which 
remained in the population under observation for long periods, it was then 
possible to reconstruct such matters as the total childbearing experience 
of a given woman, the* frequency of premarital conception of-live births.and 
the age at marriage of a family's children--even where.the individual records 
of vital events lacked thGse items. Historical demographers began to produce 
long, fine, fascinating series of demographic indices for periods before the 
/ 
census, ' before governmental imposition of. vital registration, indeed 
before the emergence of demography itself. 
What is more, the.results proved important to historians and demographers 
alike. The historians, for example, not.only acquired demographic series 
to relate to the observations of.wages, prices, production and.politica1 
change they had long been accumulating, but also discovered that an agrarian 
world they had considered relatively innpobile and isolated was swarming with 
geographic mobility and quickly responsive to changes in economic conditions. 
The demographers acquired strong evidence of controls over fertility and 
nuptiality in periods and places which should, by widely-held hypotheses, 
have displayed high, fairly stable, socially uncontrolled rates. Both 
historians and demographers gained access to a body.of materials and proce- 
dures,which permitted far stronger tests of their assertions concerning 
long-run population changes than they had ever been able to manage before. 
The important yields from parish registers of births, deaths and 
marriages (or, more precisely, of baptisms, burials and weddings) led 
historical demographers to search for other documents containing related 
information. They found them. Three main classes of documents contain 
information lending itself to systematic demographic analysis: 1) popula- 
tion enumerations, 2) registration of vital events, 3) by-products of pri- 
vate transactions. 
The census is the contemporary quintessence of the population 
enumeration. There are few usable censuses anywhere prior to 1800. For 
the period before 1800, historians have uncovered an abundant supply*of the 
census' ancestor: the enumeration carried on by a large organization for 
the purpose of identifying resources available to it. The organizations 
involved are mainly governments, but they include churches, estates and 
others. The resources in question are most often property of some kind, 
yet.they sometimes include labor power and special characteristics of the 
population as literacy or military experience. Fiscal records--assessment 
rolls, records of payment, and the like--are the chief variety. Conscrip- 
tion registers, cadasters, rent books, enumerations of the poor all have 
their place. Sometimes these sources contain not only enumerations of the 
people to be taxed or drafted, but also descriptions of their households 
and summaries of their health, marital status, and so on. Used in conjunc- 
tion with other documents, even those which only contain one characteristic 
of the individual will serve to establish the individual's presence or 
absence at different points in time. 
The registration of vital events became a regular activity of western 
governments during the nineteenth century. Before then some governments 
(for example, the Swedish state) registered births, marriages and deaths, 
but churches played the larger part in recording them. In particular, the 
Roman Catholic Church required the maintenance of registers, parish by 
parish, from the seventeenth century onward.   he Catholic registers and 
their Protestant counterparts have survived in abundance; they have served 
historical demographers well. 
The by-products of private transactions which serve demographic pur- 
poses include marriage contracts, testaments, deeds and the documents 
resulting from the settlement of an estate. This class of records is more 
heavily biased toward the rich and powerful than are the population enumera- 
tions and registrations of vital events. They have some compensating 
strengths: 1) they often identify a whole kin group, plus quasi-kin such 
as godparents, at the same time; 2) there are times and places in which 
most of the population seals a marriage with a contract or divides up an 
inheritance by written.agreement; 3) where the population under study is, 
in fact, an elite, the by-products,of private transactions supplement the 
standard demographic observations with rich evidence concerning wealth, 
personal connections and even quality of life. 
The historical sources containing population enumerations, registra- 
tions of vital events and by-products of private transactions are rich. 
More are coming to light every year. But they are distributed quite 
unevenly. The existence of repeated demographic observations in more or 
less comparable form depends very much on the presence of large organiza- 
tions which persist for substantial periods of time. Churches, governments 
and estates are the best historical examples. Business firms become 
important producers of some kinds of continuous series in the nineteenth 
century. 
Where such organizations are rare or weak, the historical record is 
correspondingly thin and heterogeneous; On the.whole, that means the. 
further back in time we go, the more ingenious and determined we have to 
be in locating the .sources and reworking them into comparabie form. It 
also means that with historical records it is often uncertain to what 
population the documents refer: Do these tax rolls cover the entire popu- 
lation, for example, or just the portion with enough wealth to pay taxes? 
In fact, the population covered is characteristically the clientele 
of a large organization, rather than a population in which demographers 
would take an immediate interest. The problem is then to reconstruct the 
behavior of a.demographically interesting population--a community, a class, ' 
a labor force, or something else--from observations of a large organiza- 
tion's clientele. A significant part of the historical demographer's 
expertise therefore consists of knowing the conditions under which the 
documents at hand were produced and reconstructing the.operations of.the 
organization involved. A significant part of the historical demographer's 
work consists of estimating or correcting gaps, errors or distortions in 
the record before drawing inferences from the observed population to tk-2 
population of genuine interest. 
The abundance and richness of historical records makes it possible to 
use many of them as one would use current vital registration: to detect 
class and regional differences in.mortality, to sort out the relationship 
of women's childbearing patterns to their ages at marriage or to the mor- 
tality of their previously-born children, and so on. In this regard, the 
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records simply bring new and interesting populations to the attention of 
demographers. But there are some problems for which historical materials 
have definite advantages over contemporary censuses, special surveys and 
- 
vital registration. 
To the extent that the demographic processes in question take a long 
time to work themselves out, the relevant evidence necessarily reaches back 
into history. If.we are to verify or modify theories of the "demographic 
transition" from high to low fertility and mortality, for example, we have 
no real alternative to assembling comparable series over periods spanning a. 
great deal of urbanization, industrialization and demographic change; the 
comparison of different populations at the same point in time as if they 
marked successive points in a standard progression can never answer the 
question of whether such a progression actually exists. 
Likewise, if the arguments at hand concern life histories rather than 
individual events, historical records provide fuller and more reliable 
evidence than can practically any contemporary source. If the great compu- 
terized data banks so many of us fear come into existence, they will compete 
seriously with the materials of historical demography. In the meantime, 
the demographer who confines himself to contemporary evidence must make do 
with retrospective reports which people give in interviews or.offer when 
registering births, deaths, marriages and other crucial events. Or he can 
settle for the thin, incomplete life histories accumulating in the files 
of existing organizations. For my part, I have serious objections to digging 
the records of living people out of such files, and even more serious objec- 
tions to linking the information concerning individuals in one file with 
the information in another file. (If the procedure for consultation of the 
records guarantees anonymity, shields the individuals involved from direct 
consequences of the consultation and/or requires the prior consent of the 
individuals, my objections diminish.) The methods of collective biography, 
by contrast, permit the construction of rich, complete and demographically 
informative life histories from historical records without invading the 
privacy of living persons; 
Finally, the secular trend is of interest. It is worth knowing when 
and where the world set off at its present dizzy pace of population growth, 
and how many times (if ever) the same,sort of expansion has happened before. 
In the more immediate area of this book, it is important to know whether 
the nineteenth century fertility decline of western countries followed cen- 
turies of high, stable fertility, came as the largest of recurrent declines 
in fertility, or followed--as some evidence suggests--an extraordinary 
eighteenth-century rise in fertility. By the same token, it is useful to 
have historical time-lines of mortality, fertility, urbanization and migra- 
tion with which to compare the recent experiences of the world's rapidly- 
urbanizing countries. 
So there are some circumstances in which historical.materials are not 
simply a supplementary source of demographic data, but the principal sources 
one wants to consult: where one's questions concern long-term processes, 
where the relevant evidence requires full life histories, where the secular 
trend is itself at issue. The essays later in this volume illustrate all 
three circumstances., especially the first. 
As our essays also illustrate, historical materials do not serve all 
purposes equally well; they have some characteristic.drawbacks. Where 
intentions, beliefs and knowledge figure prominently in the argument, histo- 
rical records rarely contain the direct testimony on these matters which 
a skilled interviewer elicits from living respondents. Many details of 
private.life es-cape the written record. When it comes to contraceptive 
knowledge, desired family size., sexual practices or aspirations for chil- 
dren's careers, the historical evidence is almost always indirect.. In 
these regards, our understanding of times.before,the twentieth century 
depends largely on literary treatments, testimonies of supposedly expert 
observers, penalties inflicted on transgressors, and inferences from such 
observable phenomena as child-spacing and intervals between marriages and 
first births. 
Recent Work in Historical'Demography 
- The discussion so far has another implication. Mostqof the last two 
decade's work in historical demography has been descriptive rather than 
analytical. It has consisted mainly of locating suitable sources, devising 
procedures for squeezing reliable demographic estimates from the sources, 
making the.desired estimates, then using the resulting series and cross- 
sections to formulate or corroborate verbal arguments concerning the 
populations. It has not consisted of the formulation, estimation and 
testing of rigorous models. 
The description is essential. Before national income analysis could 
become an effective tool of development theory, economists had to spend 
several decades conceptualizing national income, devising the necessary 
measurements, and accumulating reliable series for relevant populations. 
Historical demographers have been doing the equivalent of that work. 
What is more, the descriptions have often proved valuable in themselves. 
For example, E.A. Wrigley's painstaking reconstruction of vital rates in 
the village of Colyton established that rural marriages and births responded 
sensitively to changing economic opportunity for centuries before the age 
of chemical and mechanical contraception. The accumulating weight of 
descriptions for European and American populations before the nineteenth 
century has crushed the idea that a shift from "natural" or "uncontrolled" 
to "controlled" fertility came with mature industrialism. Again, the great 
rapidity.with which European populations turn-out to have recouped heavy 
losses to mortality in.plague and famine has made explanations of major 
population shifts in terms of such catastrophes less plausible than they 
had been. The descriptive work has established that long before the indus- 
trial age a large region of southern.and western Europe displayed what 
John Hajnal has called the "European marriage pattern": relatively later 
marriage for females, many people permanently unmarried, many households 
-- 
containing unmarried adults as well as a married couple; this arrangement 
sets early modern Europe off from the rest of the world, and may well have 
made the region's permanent shift to low fertility easier to manage. 
Finally, the descriptive version of historical demography has become a 
standard tool of historians who have no abiding interest in demographic 
issues as such; following the lead of Pierre Goubert's studies of Beauvais 
and its region, they have the means of incorporating information about the 
life experiences of ordinary people into accounts of the economic, social 
and political transformation of a village, city or region. 
By analytical work I simply mean work which asserts a regular rela- 
tionship among two or more variables, and attempts to tesc the asserted 
relationships by means of reliable evidence. One reason that little of 
the work in historical demography to date has been analytical in this sense 
is that the questions which first drew investigators into the effort were 
largely descriptive: when and where did fertility begin its long-run 
decline? Did pre-industrial cities have high levels of mortality? Another 
reason is that the data for dealing with several variables simultaneously 
were slow to produce. And a third reason is that a major part of the empi- 
rical work was done by historians and others who were not accustomed to the 
formal modeling and testing of the relationships which interested them. 
The arrival of quantitatively-trained economists, economic historians-and 
sociologists on the scene accelerated the analytic work in historical 
demography. 
One simple illustration comes from.the work of Dov Friedlander (1969, 
1970). Friedlander adopts a version of Kingsley Davis' account of the 
demographic transition. He takes from it the idea that a rural population 
which experiences great population pressure (e.g. as a consequence of 
declining mortality) tends to respond either by lowering fertility or by 
accelerating out-migration., The greater the opportunities for out,-migration, 
the longer rural fertility will remain high. Friedlander provides a set of 
hypothetical calculations showing how the two alternatives would work. 
Then, using already-published data, he argues that the British and Swedish 
experiences conform to the two alternatives: the British urbanizing early, 
absorbing plenty of rural population through out-migration, and experi- 
encing relatively late declines in rural fertility, the Swedes urbanizing 
late, having relatively little rural-to-urban migration while. mortality 
declined in the countryside, and experiencing substantial rural -declines in 
fertility before large-scale urbanization. 
Later we shall encounter two related difficulties in this approach. 
First, if we have the agricultural population in mind,.the formulation neglects 
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an alternative which often occurred in western countries: the movement of 
agricultural workers into manufacturing within the countryside. Second, as 
a.practica1 matter it is very hard to measure "population pressure" inde- 
pendently of the responses it is supposed to produce. Still the Friedlander 
argument immediately suggests extensions to other parts of.Europe--including 
France, a relatively late urbanizer and a classic case of early fertility 
decline. 
The Friedlander work lies halfway between description and rigorous 
analysis; although the central model is fairly precise, Friedlander.neither 
. - .: 
estimates- its parameters.nor tests.its £if, to the available data. It is 
nonetheless a useful example; it shows the intersection of theories about 
the.demographic transition, contemporary-demographic models and procedures, 
and historical .evi,dence. 
. . 
' - The "Demograph'ic Transition" Today 
The problem of demographic transition dominates .the historical study 
of vital processes today, as ,it ,has for thirty .or forty years. In their 
baldest, non-technical form, the pressing questions are: 
1. . How and why did the populations of western countries move. 
from high 1evels.of fertility and mortality before 1750 to low 
levels of fertility and mortality after 1900, while almost none 
of the non-western world went through the same experience? 
2. To what extent is the general process (or, failing that, 
particular relationships within it) generalizable to populations 
currently undergoing urbanization, industrialization and intensi- 
fication of communications flows? 
In his classic brief statement of.1925, A.M. Carr-Saunders did not regard 
either of these as greatly problematic. "There is no mystery about the 
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fall in the death-rate," he declared. "It was due to improved sanitary 
conditions and to advances in the study of medicine." (Carr-Saunders 1925: 
4 0 ) .  The decline in the birth rate was, he thought, somewhat more compli- 
cated',. but "While it is impossible to estimate the prevalence of contracep- 
tive practrFes and of abstention from intercourse, it .is probable that they 
account for the whole.of the decline which the figures-show;" (Carr- 
Saunders 1925: 42). 
In general, Carr-Saunders argued that increased economic efficiency 
ge.h"aliTed and encouraged a population to expand through increases in fertility, 
while signs of diminishing returns from technical innovation led the members 
of the population to restrict births by one means or another.' Although he 
did not formulate the problem of future population growth in terms of what 
would happen as.new areas of the world industrialized or urbanized;.he held 
out the hope that the same semi-conscious process of adjustment would occur 
elsewhere., 
Over the .next two decades, western students of population paid rather. 
: '  more attention to the steadily declining growth rates of.their own countries 
.. . than to the accelerating growth rates of the non-western world. !'Inadequately 
explored in a still-Kiplingesque West," writes Joseph.Spengler, "were impli- 
cations of the fact that while the rate of population growth in a politically 
.*fissured Western world was falling, that of underdeveloped lands, containing 
about two-thirds of.the world's people, was incipiently high and potentially 
risingt' (Spengler 1972: 339). 
The idea of a regular and general demographic transition crystallized: 
11 modernization" quickly and decisively depressed-mortality, .mainly through 
the development and diffusion of a) new aspirations which were incompatible 
with the bearing of large numbers of children, b) contraceptive knowledge. 
The debate remained open.about which features of."modernization"--urban 
life, for example, or .the opening of.individua1 careers requiring an 
investment in education--really mattered. However it worked, the conse- 
- . - _  
quences were clear: . accelerating natural increase during the peribd-- in ' 
which mortality declined faster than fertility, then declining.natura1 
increase as "modernization" proceeded. still farther. Presumably the same 
cycle would occur in the poor parts of.the world if they could properly 
begin.the process of.moderniqation. . 
Since World War 11, the terms of the discussion have altered--but not- 
fundamentally. The idea of an early, general mortality decline resulting 
from technical change has persisted, despite some doubt about the life- 
saving.effects of medical improvements before quite recent years, despite 
increasing emphasis on a reliable food supply as a life-saver, and despite 
the realization that in the contemporary world governments were introducing 
controls over disease in areas which showed no signs of "modernization" in 
most other regards; the theory made these areas dubious candidates for the 
next steps of the demographic transition. 
Another of the original ideas has persisted: - that the transition 
occurs--if it occurs--through the widespread conversion of married couples 
to the deliberate, efficient control of births. The major alterations in 
the discussion since World War I1 have been: 1) the recognition that levels .. 
of nuptiality and fertility are much higher in important parts of the 
contemporary non-western world than they were in most of.the West before 
the nineteenth century's massive fertility decline began, 2) the growth of 
the idea that high rates of natural increase (notably those resulting from 
the deliberate control of mortality in poor, high-fertility populations) 
in themselves block the economic path to the situation in which increases 
in production, in.the long run, actually depress fertility, 3) an increasing 
--,-: 
insistence on government-.policy as the means to population control. W.D. 
Borrie made a characteristic.recent.statement: 
With regard to the basic requirement of food, the race between 
Malthus' hare of population growth and tortoise of food produc- 
tion still. goes on, with .the -latter showing some signs at least 
of catching up a little. I The next step, which is now being 
recognized in the forward planning. of high growth regions is to 
sustain,the .balance between food production, social investment 
and industrial investment. . Thwarted .by. their f ailur,e .to . reach 
this desiderztum in face of ever expanding population growth 
rates, many of the 'developing' countries have now, as we have 
seen, turned to a new line--in Malthusian terms ho~~to;~ersuade 
&--+?-- . ;,,,,- the>hare to go to sleep for a while. The limited success so - -- 
far should not be interpreted as inability to.bring about,curbs. 
to growth. The experiments-now being tried are at most a decade 
old. The demographic transition of today's- 'developed.' .countries 
of western and northe-rn Europe and Europe overseas .took from 
fifty to seventy years.to accomplish. The trends this centu-h -- -L - . .  
eastern Europe and Japan are reminders that events can move 
faster in the twentieth century. The new element in -the. present . 
situation of the '.developing.' areas is the.widespread determina--, 
tion of.governments to act and to lead theirr--.q&e toward the 
goal of population control ...( Borrie 1970: 294-295). 
Thus the question is still whether and how the poor countries of the 
world can recapitulate the demographic experience of the rich countries. 
But now the pressing questions for research appear to be first, under 
what conditions do married couples actively restrict births? Second, 
does "mqdeei-hization" produce those conditions in a reliable, regular 
way? Third, to what extent (and how). is thelproduction of.those condi- 
tions a feasible object of government policy?. 
Historical demography is unlikely to produce firm answers to the 
third question. But it has some capacity to answer the first two. In 
fact, the two questions have dominated the analytical agenda of recent 
historical demography. The historical study of fertility has over- 
shadowed the study of mortality, migration, social mobility and even 
nuptiality. The recurrent hope of historical demographers has been to 
develop an account of fertility change which would simultaneously 
a) explain fluctuations before the nineteenth century, b) clear up 
uncertainties abouttthe western demographic transition and c) shed 
light on the.populations of the contemporary.world. 
The Historical Agenda 
While historical demographers have concentrated:on the demographic. 
transition in.genera1 and fertility in particular, other investigators. 
have applied demographic procedures to.a much wider.range of historical 
problems. In so far as this work concentrates on determining what 
happened in particular times and.places rather than describing or, 
analyzing some general demographic phenomenon, we can conveni ent ly call 
it "demographic.history'.' instead.of historical.demography. The dis- 
tinction is not precise, but it .is useful. 
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I shall make no attempt to summarize the.history of demographic 
history. Nor shall-I try to prepare a comprehensive outline.of.its 
subject.matter. Instead, I want.to mention some large clusters of 
historical problems which have already .attracted demographic attention. 
They are likely to attract a good deal more: I concentrate on European 
experience,.with side glances at North America. That concentration 
ignores excellent work.being done in Asia and Latin America, but it 
allows me to show connections and to work with the material I know best. 
At the base of the whole heap of questions comprising contemporary 
demographic history lies one huge question: how did fundamentally 
agrarian populations turn into essentially urban-industrial populations? 
The question applies throughout the .world. If we want to .deal with 
large populations and nearly-completed transformations, however, we 
must confine .our attention to Europe, its.extensions, and Japan. 
In Europe of the,last.five centuries or so, the question is more 
precisely how a predominantly peasant population turned into an urban- 
industrial one. The narrowing to peasants matters. Let us employ the 
term in a strict sense: members of households whose major activity is 
farming, which produce a major part of the goods and services they 
consume, which exercise substantial control over the land they farm, 
and which supply the.major part of their.labor requirements from their 
own energies. Nomads, hunters, fishermen, plantation laborers and 
many other rural workers drop out. 
In that narrow sense, the world's major areas of peasant.agri- 
culture have.been.China, Japan, India and Europe. Occasionally someone 
makes a supplementary case for Central America, Indonesia or parts of 
Africa. Peasant agriculture in this sense rarely (or never) appears 
in the absence of cities, extensive markets and large-scale structures 
of political control. The narrowing matters here for two reasons: 
1) We have reasons to believe that the demographic characteristics of 
peasants differ significantly from those of other rural populations. 
2) In the case of Europe and its extensions, the distinction of peasants 
from other members of.the rural population helps identify profound 
alterations in rural social life and in the composition of the rural 
population which occurred while the population as a whole remained 
mainly rural. 
Both points will receive plenty of attention later in this book. 
We shall, for example, repeatedly consider the possibility that the 
European peasant household (or the peasant community, or both) operated 
as an effective population-control mechanism, closely matching the oppor- 
tunities for marriage and procreation to the nunber of persons the land 
could support. We shall also encounter evidence that rural wage-labor 
expanded considerably before any substantial urbanization of Europe and 
its extensions, and that the expansion of rural wage-labor tended to 
weaken the peasant system of population control. In fact, the arguments 
of this book suggest an unexpected, paradoxical extrapolation to the 
contemporary world: that the poor, economically dependent populations 
of the world are repeating the demographic experiences of the proletarian 
segments of western rural populations under conditions of more complete 
proletarianization and more thorough penetration of capitalism than occurred 
in the rural west. More on that later. 
The transformation of peasant into urban-industrial populations, 
is an old, old preoccupation of wesrern historians. Demographic histo- 
rians,,did not discover it., There are, however, new advantages to 
stating the problem demographically. First, we .are'now beginning to 
accumulate the demographic evidence which can,make the.analysis of the 
transformation .more.than a vague:metaphor. Second,.the demographic 
statement of the.prob1em helps specify what there is to explain. For 
example,. it is a long leap from..the. observation of a net loss.of 
peasants accompanied by a net gain.of urban workers to the conclusion, 
that peasants,moved off the land into urban factories. If,peasants, 
themselves made . the moye, it is at. least possible that they experienced 
the shock of .uprooting, unfami1iar.surroundfngs and unpleasant work 
routines and.responded. to the.shoek with despair, disorganization or 
rebellion. But the net shift is also compatible with a.chain of moves: 
peasants into rural ,wage-labor, rural workers into urbsn services, city- 
.. . , . 
born children of rural migrants into factories, and.so on, 
Many historians--and even more sociologists, political.sci-entists 
and economists .. . seeking to build historical support for thefr.analyses of 
development--have offered the first interpretation. I consider the 
- . #  
second more likely. Whether either interpretation is correct, however, 
does not matter much here. What matters is that demographers almost 
intuitively ask rhe essential intermediate questions: What part did 
differential fertility and mortality play in the populacion shifts under 
discussion? What was the size and composition of the various flows 
betweentindustrial sectors and between rural and urban areas? Did the. 
patterns of fertility, nuptialfty and mortality themselves change.as a 
consequence of the flows? The demographer brings to such historical 
questions an.accounting framework which helps specify the when, where 
and . how. 
The demographic side of the inquiry into the creation of urban- 
industrial out of peasant.populations breaks into three kinds of questions: 
. . 
1) connectiins of ,population growth. and. economic change, 2) .components 
of growth and compositional changes, 3) small-scale processes, Let me 
take up and.illustrate each one in turn. 
Population.Growth and Economic Change 
Any attempt to .generalize about popula,tion growth and .econom+.c 
change immediately confronts contradictions, Over the long run, popula- 
. -. 
tion growth and economic expansion generally accompany each other. 
Likewise, economic decline and demographic contraction tend to occur 
together. In the.short run, fertility and nuptiality tend to.respond 
.--- - - ... 
mortality to respond.negatively, to upswings in economic 
well-being. Yet the demographic transition associates declining fertility 
- .  
and mortality--and, eventually, decelerating natural increase--with 
economic growth. In order.to make consistent statements, we have to 
disaggregate: different rules for different time-scales, no doubt; 
different generalizations for different vital processes, certainly; 
perhaps different arguments for different populations and eras as well. 
Then it may be possible to see chat all the regularities resulc from the 
operation of the same.elementary principles in varying circumstances. 
At present that is a hope, not a promise, 
One common way of-disaggregating the problem has been to. concen- 
trate on shorter-run fluctuations in vital events: seasonal, annual or 
cyclical. Far more of the short-run studies have dealt with fertility 
and nuptiality than with mortality. Available studies divide into those. 
concentrating on the .relationships among.str.ictly demographic variables 
and those treating demographic fluctuations as possible responses to 
economic fluctuations. The first is the particular ,province.of -demo- 
graphers., It includes a high proportion of sophisticated theoretical 
work and another high proportion of.painstaking measurement, but not' 
much.testing.of:models. A characteristic.essay in this vein is Roland 
Pressatls,decomposition of births in any particular year.into three 
.- - -- 
factors: the age composition of-the- female population, the lifetime 
fertility of,.the various .female.birth cohorts at -risk to have.children 
in.that year, and the fertility level attributable tq that'year as such. 
. - 
Starting .from there and using well-known data for white American females, 
he makes a plausible case.that from 1920 to 1930 the annual fluctuations 
. . \ 
in births included a significant tendency for lifetime .fertility to 
decline -from one birth.cohort,to the. next., while during the.1930~ the 
best..estimate..of:the annual change in lifetime fertility.is.0 (Pressat 
Again, Ggsta Carlsson's.analysis of variations in Swedish marital 
. .. 
fertility from.1830,to 1879 (Carlsson 1970) deals directly with the 
impact of nuptiality onsfertility fluctuations, then goes.on to.propose 
arguments linking sho'rt-run rises in marital fertility to economic well- 
being. The main,statistical results ,are a demonstration that short-run 
fluctuations in births occur in partial independence of the marriage 
rate, and a strong suggestion of birth control within SwedSsh marriages 
of the nineteenth century. Carlsson does not take the next logical 
step: the direct modeling and measurement of the relationship of 
fertility to economic fluctuations. 
Others do. In one of the most sophisticated and comprehensive 
demographic treatments of the subject, Henri ~6ridon (1973) concentrates 
on month-to-month variation in fertility. Once he clears away various 
statistical obstacles with exquisite precision, he arrives at findings 
which are mainly negative or uncertain. Definite seasonal patterns 
appear in series from France and elsewhere, it is true. They are remar- 
kably constant fr.om one.year to the next. But the differences among 
months are small compared to those reported for old-regime Europe or for 
poor agrarian countries of the contemporary world. Differences.in 
seasonal patterns among countries and among social classes are declining. 
Once corrected for seasonal effects, month-to-month variation in fertility 
from 1950 to 1969 shows no significant relationship either to earlier 
fluctuations in marriage or to economic variables such as industrial pro- 
duction, employment and savings. 
The last set of findings may surprise people who have been reading 
analyses of anr~ual and cyclical variations in fertility. Although there 
is some dissent (e.g. Sweezy 1971), the bulk of the available theorizing 
and the mass of the available statistical results attribute a significant 
positive effect on fertility to economic well-being. K.G. Basavarajappa's 
concise summary of his analysis of Australia says, "An analysis of age- 
specific marriage and age-duration of marriage-specific confinement 
rates showed that, during the. interwar years (1920-21 to 1937-38), the 
movements in these rates were very closely associated with the movements 
in economic conditions" (Basavarajappa 1971:50). In the case of Italy, 
from 1863 to 1964, "in the first seventy-five years ... the conformity 
among marriages, births and business cycle is rather high'and without 
trend either in its intensity or in its direction. ..the recent two decades 
bring an attenuation, rather than a consolidation, of the concordance 
between business cycle and demographic phenomena...'' (Santini 1971: 581). 
Likewise, Mor.ris Silver follows up his similar analysis of the 
United States.with repor.ts for the United Kingdom 1855-1959 'and Japan 
1878-1959: "Births and marriages in the United Kingdom conform positively 
to ordinary.business cycles. The cyclical response of births is not simply 
a reflection of cyclical fluctuations.in~marriages; it is, at least in 
part, a.direct response. These conc1,usions also seem to hold for births 
in.Japan and possibly for marriages. In addition, births in both countries 
seem to conform positively.to Kuznets cyclesin national income" (Silver 
1966: 315.). He finds no evidence that the strength of the cyclic response 
changed over time. 
Like most of the work which.boldly.relates short-term fertility 
fluctuations to changing economic conditions, Silver's analysis rests on ' 
a rudimentary.mode1: a stream of births moves in response to changing 
national income, which presumably represents the opportunities ,and costs 
impinging on couples capable of having children. He uses relatively simple 
detrended regressions to estimate the basic-relationships. To find work 
which attempts to specify the entire process connecting fertility to 
changing economic opportunity, we must turn to theoretical syntheses 
such as the-orie Richard Easterlin provides in this volume. Easterlin's 
own empirical investigations of American fertility fluctuations (e.g. 
Easterlin 1973), for example, work with incomplete models and only 
estimate a few.of the relationships involved. We shall encounter other 
efforts to model the.economic conditions affecting fertility when we 
come to,the study of the small-scale processes. 
We have a longer-run version of the same problem: if .growth 
promotes population .increase, how does that happen? Karlheinz -~laschke ' s
massive study of the Saxon population from 1100 to 1843 brings out a 
contrast which .is now standard in ~uro~ean demographic history: purely 
- - 
agricultural zones with a limited holding capacity, exporting their '-'- 
--.,... a 
irregular natural increase to cities and to industrial regions; rural 
industrial zones of almost unlimited absorptive capacity: 
In these areas social differentiation developed early and to 
an extreme; the especially fast growing segment of their 
population, moreover, was the people whose basic economic 
activity was in handicrafts. This segment of.the population 
and these areas in,general provided the starting-point for a 
---- 
---.. . --- .genuine industrial development in the nineteenth century; the 
industrial revolution could attach itself without a break to 
the existing structure (Blaschke 1967: 231). 
Blaschke's study has the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of 
the historical literature:. a fine sense of time and place, plus 
coverage 0f.a great span of change; little specification of the exact 
demographic mechanisms by which changes occurred. The obvious sequel 
is a closer study of the interplay of mortality, fertility, nuptiality 
and migration in at least some portions of Saxony's 750-year transfor- 
mation. 
Much of the existing wor'k in demographic history works in the 
other direction, seeking the consequences of population growth instead 
of its causes. In speaking of eighteenth-century England, H.J. Habakkuk 
enumerates five ways in which the substantial population increase may 
have stimulated economic growth: by producing economies of scale, by 
making cheap labor abundant, by inciting a search for new methods to 
substitute labor for capital and natural resources, by promoting invest- 
ment and by inducing extra effort from cultivators (Habakkuk 1971: 
47-48). Not all of these strike me as plausible, or consistent with the 
others. In any case, they cry out for explicit modeling--including the 
representation of effects in the other direction, from economic growth 
to population increase. The successful modeling and testing of these 
relationships will be of the greatest interest to students of today's 
poor but fast-growing countries. 
The same is true of the more rigorous (but no less controversial) 
argument Ester Boserup has applied to agriculture. Notfng the association 
of high population density and highly-productive agriculture, Boserup 
argues against the basic Malthusian assumptions of an inelastic supply of 
I 
land with diminishing returns from intensification. More exactly, she 
argues that under population pressure the inputs of labor (as exemplified 
by clearing of wastes or introduction of irrigation) tend to increase 
L 
sufficiently to override the diminishing returns due to the quality of 
land brought under cultivation. Therefore population increase stimulates 
agricultural productivity. 
Coupled with the recent arguments (for instance, those of E.L. Jones) 
treating agricultural improvement as,a stimulus to manufacturing, Boserup's 
analysis leads to an anti-Malthusian conception of the whole process of 
economic growth. Indirectly, it therefore raises questions about the 
supposed swamping of today's poor-nations by excessive population growth. 
The answer could be, of course, that the.relationship is curvilinear: some 
middling rate of population increase is most favorable to economic growth,. 
while higher and lower rates are deletrious. Or it could be that Boserup 
is wrong. However the Boserup thesis comes out, the modeling and measure- 
ment of these relationships clearly belong on the agenda of demographic 
history, and her work has helped place.them there. 
One important exception to the simple correlation between.popu1ation 
growth and agricultural productivity ,is the case of rural industry., In 
Europe and the Americas, there was a strong association between the.expan- 
sion of rural industry and rapid population growth, on.the one hand, 
between rural industrial concentrations and high rural densities, on the 
other. The causal connections are,just as,hard to specify in the case,of. 
rural industry as in the case.of agriculture. 1n.a recent c1ose;look at 
0 
the phenomenon, ~rnogt Klimz reports : 
In eighteenth-century Bohemia, population density varied in dif- 
-. 
ferent parts of the country, being much higher in the mountainous 
and less-fertile regions. Statistics for 1764 give the average 
density of population for the whole country as 37.3 per square 
, 
kilometre: 48 in the mountainous part of northern Bohemia 
but only 32.4 elsewhere; thus the less-fertile parts had a 
density almost 30 percent above the average for the country. 
Towards the end of the century, in 1789, the country average 
had risen to 54.8 per square kilometre, but that of the - 
linen districts of northern Bohemia rose to 82, while the 
i 
very fertile regions of Bohemia had no more than 56 per, 
0 
square kilometre (Klima 1974: 50). 
The observation recalls Blaschke's findings for Saxony. We shall encoun- 
ter the same contrast in ~raun's analysis of the ~Krich region, later in 
this book. 
/ 
Klima, Blaschke and Braun are describing protoindustrialization: 
the expansion of manufacturing outside the factory system. It occurs by 
means of an increase in the number of producing units rather than a 
change in technology or a shift in the average scale of production. A. 
great deal of European and American industrial expansion before 1850 
happened through protoindustrialization; much of it took place in poor 
rural areas rather than in towns or cities. 
Protoindustrialization has an important place in European and 
American demographic history. It is a ,major source of rapid population 
growth. It deserves special study because it provides a large series of 
partly independent natural experiments in which dissimiliar populations 
responded to changing economic opportunity by adjusting their patterns of, 
nuptiality and fertility. 
If the current drift of scholarly opinion is.right, rural industry 
tended to grow up in regions combining 1) an underemployed land-poor 
population; that is a possible consequence of immigration, partible 
inheritance, enclosures or rapidly declining mortality; in these cir- 
cumstances, forms of agriculture with relatively inelastic labor require- 
ments,. such as dairy .farming,,favored rural industry over the intensification 
. . -- 
of agriculture; 2) access to urban markets for cheap finished goods. To 
be sure, merchants small and large played a crucial part in linking rural 
producers to raw rnaterials.and to urban markets; but the supply of 
merchants seems to have been highly elastic everywhere. 
Protoindustrialization raises several different demographic problems. 
First, how regularly, and how, did rapid population growth precede the 
linking of cheap labor to urban markets via rural manufacturing? Second, 
is it.true that the availability of employment in rural industry tended 
to lower the age of. marriage, increase both legitimate and illegitimate 
fertility, and reduce the household to the nuclear family without servants? 
Third, is it true that the process was asymmetrical--expanding- employment 
produced rapid population growth, but contracting employment simply produced 
misery--and that the resulting industrial population was more vulnerable to 
the wage-price scissors than the agrarian population was? Part of the 
problem is to what extent these tendencies are peculiarly true of. rural 
manufacturing, rather than landless labor in general. During the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the landless increased in both agriculture and 
industry; whatever the cause and effect, before 1900 the bulk of the rapid 
population increase-resulting from the western demographic transition 
occurred among the rural landless. Working out the demographic role of 
protoindustrialization would therefore aid.our understanding of the western 
demographic transition. 
Both protoindustrialization and the growth of landless labor in 
agriculture homogenized the economic experience of the rural population: 
1arger.and larger groups of people responded more or less.simultaneously 
to-the same fluctuations in prices, wages and-employment. The transfor- 
mation shows up in the changing pattern.of migration. 1n.Europe and 
America, there is no real evidence that large-scale industrialization 
greatly increased the frequency with .which people changed residence. 
But the distances they moved increased tremendously. 
The reason scholars have thought otherwise is that they have 
seriously underestimated the mobility of pre-industrial rural populations. 
Demographic historians whq look at the subject directly almost invariably 
come out with high rates of turnover. - In an agricultural commdnity of 
Sweden, in.1881-1885, for example,, Eriksson and Rogers arrive at mobility 
Q 
rates in the range of 0.5 moves per person-year of residence (Agren et al. 
9 n 
1973: 72). - In the town of Eskilstuna and its vicinity, Ohngren computes 
annual rates  of gross migration (in-migration + out-migration) in the. range 
of 200 per thousand population in the 1850s and 1860s. In the period of 
rapid industrialization which followed, the rates rose to 300 or so. Even 
then they were often higher than that in the nearby agricultural parishes 
(Ohngren 1974: 374-375). "In Hallines and Longuenesse (Pas-de-Calais) for 
the periods of 1761-1773 and 1778-1790,'' Poussou reports, "we find 51.3 
and 36.3 percent of the population leaving, 45.2 and 45.1 percent of the 
population arriving, in twelve years'' (Poussou 1971: 20). In these and 
other places, the. average distance covered by migrants greatly increased 
as essentially local exchanges of labor gave way to large-scale movements 
among rural areas and; especially between country and city. 
Giovanni Levi (1971) reviewed a number of recent works in French 
demographic history dealing directly or indirectly with population 
mobility. He proposed a three-phase summary of migration from the 
seventeenth century to the early nineteenth: 
1. extensive movement but small net flows, dominated by 
a) circular movements of specialized non-agricultural wor- 
kers between town and country as well as among towns, 
b) movements--especially seasonal--of agricultural laborers 
within the countryside, c) flows of beggars and.unemployed 
workers in all directions, depending on the. current geography 
. .. .. i. 
of hardship; 
2. rising long-term migration, increasing net movements from 
rural to urban areas and to industrializing.rura1 areas, 
associated with and resulting from the increase of..rural land- 
less labor, the formation of large-scale labor markets and the 
rise of periodic unemployment; 
3 .  large, permanent. flows from rural to urban areas resulting 
from the deindustrialization of the countryside, the growth of 
large urban industries and the declining demand .for labor in 
agriculture. 
Levi assumes that the third type of migration.moved many people from faming 
directly into-manufacturing. That is probably incorrect. Some of that im- 
pression is due to the movement of rural industrial workers into urban 
industry. The main flow out of agriculture probably went into services. 
Furthermore, Levi's scheme neglects the large backflows behind the net move- 
ments in,his second and third phases. 
A more adequate model would replace.the phases with statements 
about three sets of variables: a) the rising scale of labor.markets, 
b) the conditions under.which workers move among labor markets (includ- 
ing markets defined by different industries, whether geographically 
separated or not), c) the changing geography of job opportunities. 
Nevertheless, Levi's summary catches the distinctions among circular, 
chain and career migration (C. Tilly 1974: 288-296). It also gives a 
sense of the process by which small-scale but fairly regular movements 
of workers gave way to large-scale, irregular movements. In the process, 
large segments of the rural population fell into the rhythm of national 
5' 
and international fluctuations in economic activity. 
At.the extreme, whole regions became the economic dependencies of 
distant capitals. . Their demographic experiences came to depend on the. 
rise and fall of demand for their products,in faroff places. For Java, 
Clifford Geertz (1963) has described the process of "agricultural 
involution": villages adjacent to foreign-owned plantations sold their 
labor to.the plantations, retreated (often under pressure) from market 
production to subsistence agriculture, grew rapidly, eventually became 
dependent and vulnerable. So long as the world market for Indonesian 
sugar, rubber or tobacco expanded, the villagers multiplied and survived. 
When the plantations collapsed, the villages.sank into misery. 
In a broadly similar manner, the grain-growing regions of,eastern 
Europe were becoming dependencies of Amsterdam and the other commercial- 
industrial centers of northwestern Europe during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The growth of the "second serfdom" in eastern 
Europe consisted mainly of large landlords' assuming direct management of 
their properties instead of continuing to live on rents, using the help 
.A. . 
of the political authorities to.coerce labor from their peasants and to 
fix them in place, and raising .wheat on a large scale for export via 
such commercial centers as -~dgnsk (Danzig) or Riga. 
A direct chain of credit attached the manors of Poland and Pomerania 
to the bankers of Antwerp. In his recent synthesis, Immanuel Wallerstein 
put it this way: 
This system of international debt peonage enabled a cadre of 
international merchants to bypass (and thus eventually destroy) 
the indigenous merchant classes of eastern Europe (and to some 
extent those of southern Europe) and enter into direct links 
with landlord-entrepreneurs (nobility included) who were essen- 
tially capitalist farmers, producing the goods and keeping 
control of them until they reached the first major port area, 
after,which they were taken in hand by some merchants of west 
European (or north Italian) nationality who in turns worked 
through and with a burgeoning financial class centered in a 
few cities (Wallerstein 1974: 122). 
There is a demographic side to all this: the argument requires a 
substantial labor shortage at the beginning of the process. It suggests 
that the considerable growth of the east European population during the 
sixteenth century resulted from migration--from deliberate colonization 
of thinly-occupied frontier lands. On the other hand, the scattered 
accounts now available indicate that the sections of eastern Europe 
devastated by the Thirty Years' War in the following century recovered 
their losses quickly through natural increase. Perhaps natural increase 
also played a significant part in the sixteenth century. 
We encounter.the possibility that the same sort of saturation pro- 
cess that Geertz attributes to Java under the plantation system occurred 
in eastern Europe under the.hegemony of the great wheat-growing estates, 
Faint in the background flickers a fascinating possfbilicy: that the 
high rates of population growth in coday's Third World countries will 
turn out to be less consequences of cheir own peculiar.interna1 organi- 
zations than effects of their economic relationships with the rich 
countries of the West. The first scraps of information favoring such an 
interpretation would be discrepancies between results of cross-sectional 
and over-time analyses of fertility, evidence of a relationship between 
fertility and economic dependency (as indexed, for example, by the share 
of raw-material exports in.nationa1 income) and signs of strong respon- 
siveness of fertility in Third World countries to fluccuations in the 
world prices of their primary exports, Several years ago, Nathan Keyfitz 
(1965) suggested in passing that some such mechanisms were at work in the 
Third World. So far as I know, neither he nor any other demographer has 
followed up the suggestion seriously, 
Work on population growth and economic change bears on the funda- 
mental problems of western economic history. Assumptions concerning 
population processes underlie the alternative explanations of the 
industrial revolution which are now available. Our present scaLe of 
uncertainty and ignorance concerning those population processes lays down 
a double challenge to demographic historians: to explicate and test the 
alternative models now in use, to specify the demographic mechanisms 
whereby the transformation to'an urban-industrial population occurred, 
Components of Growth and Compositional Changes 
In its simplest terms, the problem is to allocate the changes in 
size of the major populations under study among three factors: fertility, 
mortality and migration. British scholars, for example, are still de- 
bating to what extent the substantial eighteenth-century growth of 
population was due to a rise in fertility or a fall in mortality; a 
complete account would also allow for in-migration (e.g. from Ireland) 
and out-migration (e.g. to North America). How the three components 
changed makes a considerable difference to our interpretation of the 
period's social and economic history, If declining mortality is the chief 
contributor, we can imagine the rapid growth as starting without much 
prior change in the structure of everyday life: people were already recep- 
tive to life-saving innovations, and medical or sanitary improvements can 
begin without substantial prior changes in the average person's daily 
routines. (It is.more.difficult, but not impossible, to make the same sort 
of argument for life-saving improvements in nutrition or food supply). 
If rising fertility or accelerating in-migration make major contribu- 
tions to growth, on the other hand, almost any model of the change we can 
fashion will imply large prior changes in the local structure of opportunities. 
Thus the elementary analysis of population growth into its components sets 
important constraints on the possible explanations of the growth, and thereby 
on general interpretations of the period's social and economic history. 
Components-of-growth analysis also helps with che details .of economic 
and social history. For example, historians of Europe and America have 
sometimes explained the widespread rise of illegitimate births around 
the beginning of the nineteenth century and the widespread decline in 
illegitimacy around the end of the century as a.consequence of general 
changes in attitudes toward sexuality or the disruption.caused by rapid 
industrialization. (For surveys, see Shorter 1971, 1972, 1973, Shorter, 
Knodel and van de Walle 1971, Smith 1973.) Illegitimacy has also been 
offered as evidence of changing attitudes or of disruption, but that forq 
of argument assumes what must be proven. Now, female.employment in 
domestic service increased, then decreased, in something like the same 
rhythm. Domestic servants were always one of the main sources of illegi- 
timate children. So the .rise and -fall of domestic .service may.account 
for a major part of the trajectory of illegitimacy, without any.genera1 
change in attitude or any general disruption of family life. In many 
such,instances, it would be prudent to check out the compositional expla- 
nation before turning to the more complicated attitudinal or structural 
one. 
Obviously, we can apply a ,components-of-growth approach to any 
categorization of the population for which data are available. Here I 
only want.to sketch the significance of two overlapping processes: 
1) the proletarianization of the population in general, 2) the changing 
composition of the rural population.. 
Proletarianization is a decline in the proportion of the labor force 
who have effective control over their own means of production, an increase 
in the proportion who are essentially dependent for survival on the sale 
of their own labor power. The definition contains several traps; "effective 
control" is often hard to judge, for example, in the cases of miners, weavers 
or tenant farmers. Yet by almost any standard the proletarian share 
of the labor force increased enormously throughout the West some time 
after the fifteenth century. Between 1500 and 1800, the European popu- 
lation increased' from roughly 55 million to about 190 million. My own 
guess at a.partitioning of the increase runs as follows: 
category populatiog in populatiog i n  increase 1500 (x10 ) 1800 ..(x%O ) (x106) 
landlords, owners & 
managers of producing 0.5-1.5 2-3 1-2 
units, + their households 
peasants, + their households 25-35 70-90 40-60 
wage workers in cities of 
100,000+ & their households 0.5-0.75 4-5 
other wage workers & 
their households 
total population 50-60 180-190 125-135 
These are, evidently, only guesses at numbers for which we have but shards 
of the necessary documentation. An early item on the demographic agenda 
is to refine and correct them. Yet the guesses are not fantastic., In the 
case of England, Gregory King guessed in 1688 that there were 1.4 million 
families, of whom 1.2 drew their principal income from.agricu1ture. Of 
the 1.2 million, according to King, 350 thousand lived from their own land 
(Pollard and Crossley 1968: 154). In 1831, the census of Great Britain 
showed-1.8 million persons in agriculture, forestry and fishing; only 20 
to 25 percent of them were full-fledged farmers (Deane.and Cole 1967: 143). 
Before the late nineteenth century, most of the increase of landless 
and land-poor labor occurred outside the factory-based proletariat so dear 
to twentieth-century Marxists. As Marx himself well knew, the growth of 
landless labor in agriculture and rural industry created the mass of the 
European proletariat up to his own time; urban services and.smal1-scale 
manufacturing accounted for most of the remainder. Factory employment 
grew later. 
The analysis of proletarianization presents a standard, if difficult, 
components-of-growth problem: to what extent the swelling class of 
proletarians grew through its own natural increase and to what extent 
through movement of people from other categories. Each of these questions 
breaks down further: what were the contributions of changes in fertility? 
. ,..% 
Mortality? bong the transfers, how many were a) changes of position 
experienced by individuals within their own working careers, b) movements 
into the proletariat by the children of non-proletarians, c) movements into 
the proletariat from outside the population under. consideration, for example, 
through the enslavement of Africans?. (This last category has its own 
historical interest. Fogel and Engerman show that the natural increase of 
fi 
enslaved Blacks on the North American mainland was high enough to produce 
sustained population growth, while life expectancy of.their counterparts in 
the Caribbean was so.low that only steady importation of slaves from Africa 
maintained the population. One probable consequence is a much more contin- 
, 
uous flow of African culture.into the Caribbean. See Fogel and Engerman 
1974. ) 
The usual assumption is that the bulk of the proletariat moved into 
the class.from outside through such processes as enclosure and the absorption 
of independent craftsmen into the factory system. Those were important 
processes, no doubt. The studies of the natural increase of landless labor 
I mentioned earlier, however, raise the possibility that the proletariat 
multiplied itself to a large degree. If a careful compositional analysis 
showed that to be true, it would have profound implications for the poli- 
tical, economic and social history of the western working class. It would, 
for example, weaken Luciano.Pellicani's argument that the "internal prole- 
tariat of capitalism" came into being via a process of "total uprooting" 
(Pellicani 1973: 68). It would diminish the probable role of the "loss of 
status" as a source of working-class protest. It would increase the 
plausibility of a distinct, continuous proletarian culture. It would open 
up the possibility that the change in size and characteristics of the 
proletariat was the most dynamic element in the western demographic transi- 
tion. 
Another version of that unsettling possibility appears in the changing 
composition of~the rural population. I have already insisted that the 
rural population of western countries included many non-peasants. It.even 
included many non-agricultural~workers. 1n.the. case of France--that 
quintessentially peasant ,country--at the beginning of the ,nineteenth century 
about a third of the.labor force in,rural places was.living from services, 
manufacturing, commerce and,other non-agricultural pursuits. ("Rural" 
places included all communes with fewer than 2,000 persons in the central 
settlement.) At that point, rural textile .production was the largest 
category, but woodcarving, smelting, basketry and even.watchmaking all 
supported important clusters of rural people. Most miners also lived in, 
if not.of, the countryside. 
Miners are an informative extreme case,. Friedlander has recently 
presented. indirect evidence for the hypothesis that 
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... in coal-mining areas women- had little .opportunity for 
employment and could, therefore, contribute only little 
to the family's income and that men's earnings probably 
tended to shrink at a relatively early stage of life due 
to the nature of the special kind of work. This, and 
the ~nbalanced~age-sex distribution resulting from heavy 
immigration, may explain ... the pattern of early marriages 
and high marital fertility in coal-mining areas (Friedlander 
1973: 49). 
In .Friedlander1s analysis, extensive employment opportunities for young 
unmarried persons and lack of employment opportunities ,outside the home 
for adult women both promote high nuptiality and high fertility. 
With some modifications, Friedlander's argument may apply throughout 
the rural population. Let us return to the idea of the peasantry as a 
self-regulating population. The regulation of numbers occurs through the 
tying of marriage and the opportunity to procreate to the inheritance of 
places on the land. When mortalfty is high, all other things being equal, 
new places on the land open up more frequently, nuptiality rises and 
fertility rises as well. (One of the more important questions about this 
hypothetical system is whether fluctuations in fertility depend mainly on 
changes in nuptiality, or whether both respond independently to shifts in 
opportunity--for example, through the estimates of prospective parents 
concerning future opportunities for .their children.) 
Let us assume that the basic decision rule of couples in the system 
runs something like this: marry as soon as you can acquire a permanent 
livelihood, and adjust your number of children to rheir chances of survival 
and the probable return to the nuclear family of different levels of 
investment per child (cf. C. Tilly 1973). Then under.a long-run de- 
cline in mortality people embedded in the peasant system are likely 
to shift from relatively.high fertility to low fertility. . Opportunities 
for out-migration will presumably slow.this response. On the.other.hand, 
if attractive but expensive career:opportunities for children..arise, they 
should accelerate.the process; there will be a movement, in ~ary.~ecker's 
sardonic,terminology, toward.producing children of higher quality. 
Something like this shift probably did occur widely.among Europe's 
peasant populations .as mortality fell from the eighteenth century onward. 
It did not show up as a dramatic .and general decline in rural fertility, 
I suggest, for two.main.rea.sons: 1) because the opportunity for out-migra- 
tion .and the,opportunity far local employment outside of.peasant life both 
provided alte.rnatives to restrictions an,fertflity, 2) because the non- 
1 
peasant .population .d*d no.t .behave .in .the. same way. The first is plausible, 
but far from proven, in.the 1ight;of what we know so far. The.second is 
intriguing because the high-fertility behavior of the non-peasant population 
could result-from following the peasant decision rule under changed circum- 
stances. The rule is still.to marry as soon as you.can acquire a permanent 
livelihood, and adjust-your,number of children to their chances.of survival 
and the probable return.to the nuclear.family .of different levels of. 
investment per. child.. But for agricultural laborers and.rura1 industrial 
workers, a permanent, (if not a sumptuous) livelihood is available young, 
some remunerative labor can be squeezed from almost any.member of the house- 
hold, and a.heavy investment in one or two children would be risky. The 
resu1t.i~ high nuptiality and high.fertility. 
The hypothesis of a fundamental difference in the fertility 
behaviors of peasant and.non-peasant rural populations is intriguing 
for another reason. It.could help. account.for the gross regional differ- 
ences in European fertility before the declines of the nineteenth century. 
The relatively low pre-modern,fertility levels of Italy, France, Spain and. 
Portugal .could result from relatively high of peasants .in .the 
total. The great block of high fertility in eastern Europe could be a 
consequence of the early proletarianization of the rural population on great 
estates. We would thereby circle back\to the hypothesis linking high 
fertility to economic dependency. Let me insist that this is a chain of 
reasoning, not a chain-of evidence. Part of the task of this book is to 
confront that reasoning, and its alternative, with evidence. 
One more question raised by this line of reasoning is how fertility 
could ever have declined in the countryside. The answer is that the 
opportunities for rural wage-labor declined. It happened earlier in 
rural manufacturing than in agriculture, but it happened in both. On the 
whole, the European "rural exodus" followed the appropriate sequence: 
rural industrial workers relatively early-, agricultural wage-laborers 
somewhat later, peasants (or, at least, agricultural workers who controlled 
their own land) the last to go in large numbers (Merlin 1971). If,the 
peasants had been gradually restricting their fertility as mortality 
declined, but the non-peasants had been responding asymmetrically to 
employment opportunities, the net.effect of this pattern of departure would 
be to produce a massive, rapid decline in rural.fertility followed by a 
long, low plateau. Although the opportunities for out-migration and for 
social mobility complicate both the argument and the evidence, I think 
something like this pattern occurred widely in Europe. Again, part of 
this book's task is to set limits on that sort of reasoning. 
If my summary is correct, however, a new problem becomes salient: 
in the days of rural exodus, what happened to the fertility of the rural 
wage-laborers and their urban descendants? To produce the large, contin- 
uous declines observable in European fertility, we need some combination 
of escape from the Malthusian trap in the countryside and transformation 
of behavior coincident with migration to the cities. I suspect the change 
was slow in the country and fast-in the city--and that the crucial differ- 
ence was the availability in the city, at a high price, of opportunities 
to help one's children moye up in the world. In the short run, the 
decision rule remains the same, but the difference in available opportu- 
nities transforms the behavior. In the longer run, however, the situation 
alters so much as to produce a new decision rule. 
Small-Scale Processes 
The arguments I have just been sketching rely on assumptions about 
the behavior of individual households. Moreover, they contradict a good 
deal of common sense and a great many portrayals of pre-modern fertility 
by treating procreation as the outcome of a more or less rational weighing 
of alternatives. So risky a notion deserves direct attention. It requires 
the study of processes at a smaller scale than we have been considering so 
far: at the level of the individual, the household and the kin group. 
In the last decade, economists have been developing models of household 
behavior--including what they like to call "the production of children1'-- 
which operate at the small scale and incorporate assumptions, of rational 
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choice. Marc Nerlove (1974) has summed up the major features of the theory 
most commonly employed in recent work as.:. "...(l).-a utility function with 
arguments which are not physical commodities but home-produced bundles of. 
attributes; (2) a household production technology; (3) an external labor- 
market environment providing the,means.for transforming household resources 
into market commodities;, and.(4) a set of household resource.constraints ...I' 
(Nerlove 1974.: S210). Most of-.the work done within this framework,. as 
Nerlove observes, has been static,in character; it has given little attention 
to such problems as the effects of changing household composition, the 
investment of one generation in the welfare of succeeding generations, or 
the causes and consequences of long-run shifts in vital rates. Nevertheless, 
a number of arguments elaborated in the recent 1iterature.eonverge on the 
hypothesis that "a rise in the-cost of mother's time for the family will 
cause a substitution away.from time-intensive goods such as children and 
toward those requiring more inputs of.market-purchasable commodities" 
(Nerlove 1974: S210). 
Nerlove makes three suggestions which could connect this line of 
argument with the general pattern of the demographic transition: that the 
effect of declining child mortality is to generate a greater.demand,for 
children (since the.cost of.achieving a-given family size declines while 
the discounted.sum.of satisfactions per-child increases); that declining 
, . 
child mortality produces an offsetting decline in.the. cost of child quality 
relative to the.cost,of numbers of children; that over the course of 
economic development the value of a unit,of human time tends.to rise as a 
consequence of increasing invesfment in-human capital, with the.consequence 
of "reinforcing the.tendency,to.fewer children of ever-higher quality" 
(Nerlove 1974: S217). 
The second and third suggestions.dovetail with the arguments and 
findings presented elsewhere in this book. The first--that declining 
child mortality increases the demand for children--contradicts a.major 
theme of our papers. Although Easterlin builds direct satisfaction from 
the presence of children into his analysis (and although none of our 
authors denies that the sum of such satisfactions per child tends to rise 
as child mortality declines), our discussions stress the importance of 
desires to transmit household wealth to successive generations without 
fragmenting it. The household itself is the major unit of production 
among peasants, artisans and many varieties of merchants, manufacturers 
and service workers. Where it is, the double desire to maintain and to 
transmit household wealth is likely to be strong. To .the extent that 
this is the.dominant .incentive to procreation, the effect of declining 
child mortality on.completed family size will 5e negative, not posit!ve. 
I have already suggested, however, that proletarianization dissolved 
the nexus among employment, household position, marriage, procreation, 
inheritance and the maintenance of household continuity. As .the nexus 
weakened, so probably did the pressure to conserve and transmit household 
wealth, hence the resulting constraint on fertility. As the opportunities 
for employment of.children outside the,household expanded., the possibilities 
of enjoying them both for themselves and for the -wages they brought to.the 
household increased. The diminished pressure for household continuity 
probably also allows more room for what Philip Neher calls the "pension 
motlve": "Parents invest in their children by bearing their rearing costs 
in.anticipation of retirement when their children, in turn, will support 
them" (Neher 1971: 380). It may be, then, that Nerlo~e's formulation applies 
to today's.essentially proletarian populations, but lacks a significant. 
variable when applied to populations in which the household is the funda- 
mental unit of production as well as consumption, or to households which 
exercise collective control over substantial capital. The missing variable 
is the pressure to conserve family property. 
Speaking of missing variables, a reader from outside of economics is 
likely to be amazed that these arguments attach so little importance to 
sexual desire and satisfaction. As Richard Easterlin remarks later in this 
volume, the economics of fertility is a "notably sexless -subject.." As a - / : 
a5.' -"' - 
reaction to the crude~.Malthusianism, which has underlain so.much.previous 
writing on fertility, it is useful to have an approach.which -stresses the. 
non-sexual calculations behind fertility. Yet people do enjoy sexual inter- 
course; they sometimes pursue it. in apparent disregard.of costs.and risks. 
Unwanted children are born.both in and out of wedlock. Abortion and infan- 
ticide occur~frequently~enough~to make.us think that the .decisions leading 
to.sexual~activity .and to childbearing are.at 1east.partly separable. 
The diagnosis suggests the,remedy. We need.an analysis of decisions 
to engage in%intercourse, a separate analysis of decisions to have children, 
and:an.analysis of the constrainta.one sets for the other. The,constraints 
will include the whole series,of contingencies between,intercourse and, 
childbirth:. the .extent and effectiveness of.contraception, the fecundity 
of.the sexual partners, the likelihood of fetal.loss, and so,on. In seeking 
to synthesize ,the economics.and -sociology of.fertility, Easterlin is making. 
exactly that effort to relate arguments.concerning sexual behavior to arguments 
concerning fertility. 
- -  - - -  - . - 
-.. Historians and sociologists have commonly finessed the probl-em in 
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. one of two+w&ys. Sometimes they have treated the one set of decisions 
as dominant, the other as derivative: the essential decisions govern 
the frequency of sexual intercourse, while the probabilities of conception 
and birth are basically technical matters; or the essential decisions 
govern marriage and childbearing, while within the limits set by those . 
decisions sexual activity varies too .little.to matter. The second finesse 
is to postulate a massive change from,one system to the other: from 
"natural" to "controlled" fertility. Under natural. fertility, in this way 
of;thinking, the essential variable governing fertility is the -age structure 
of marriages. Who can.marry when is a function of economic opportunities, 
the supply of potential spouses and social pressure.. Thus fertility 
responds strongly but indirectly to changing social conditions. (In the 
baldest Malthusian arguments, however, even that response is weak.or non- 
existent; natural.fertility simply means.fertility approaching the human 
capacity.) Controlled fertility, in such a formulation, appears when 
couples acquire the individual freedom and the technical means to detach 
fertility decisions from sexual ones. Modernization provides the freedom 
and the means. 
A variant of.this argument appears in several of this book's articles. 
It postulates a shift from socially-controlled to individually-controlled 
(or, better, couple-controlled) fertility. In E.A. Wrigley's essay, for 
instance, we find the distinction between an '"unconscious rationality exer- 
cised by individuals following the norms set for them by the society in 
which they live" and a."conscious rationality characteristic of couples in 
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industrial societies where faiuily limitation is.widespread1' and the 
hypothesis of a general transition from one to the other; Wrigley 
points,out that declining mortality destroys the "unconscious ration- 
ality" of the sorts of fertility strategies which prevailed in pre- 
industrial Europe. He suggest that declining mortality has helped promote 
the fertility decline.wherever it occurred. Elsewhere (e.g. Wrigley 1972.) 
he makes a rough equation between modernization and the spread of 
conscious, economically maximizing rationality, and hints that it occurred 
largely as a consequence of the diffusion of new ideologies. 
An ironic result follows. We go from a society in which well-defined 
collective needs explain group-to-group variations in fertility while 
individual differences are matters of chance, impulse and inclination to a 
society in which collective needs set few constraints on fertility but 
individual calculation governs it very closely (cf. ~rizs 1971,). It seems 
to follow that at the level of the individual or the couple the importance 
of decisions concerning sexual behavior as determinants of fertility 
declines greatly as modernization proceeds. If that is the case, the 
further we go back in time, the less well the available economic models 
of fertility .should work. And the more sex.should matter. 
That extrapolation of Wrigley's argument. differs significantly from 
Edward Shorter's recent analyses of.illegitimacy,and sexual behavior in 
the .modern.West. Shorter.inserts another stage between the eras of 
socially-controlled and individually-controlled fertility. The middle 
stage has working class.women, liberated from family control by new oppor- 
tunities for employment outside the home, leading a general move toward 
individual gratification, including the.search for sexual pleasure. At 
the same time, middle class women lead the trend toward restriction of 
births. As the two waves wash in opposite directions, they dissolve the 
old ties among marriage, birth and procreation. The middle stage there- 
fore begins with rising fertility both inside and outside of marriage, as 
increasingly desirable and permissible sexual activity rises without a 
corresponding increase in contraceptive effectiveness; it ends with a 
decline in legitimate and illegitimate fertility, as effective contra- 
ception diffuses. 
Louise Tilly, Joan Scott and Miriam Cohen have attacked Shorter's 
argument both for lack of evidence concerning the hypothetical changes in 
attitudes and for inconsistency with what is known about the.actua1 
patterns of female employment in western countries since 1800 (Tilly, 
Scott and Cohen 1974, Scott and Tilly 1974). They have pointed out that 
large numbers of European and American women worked in the company of 
their parents and siblings, committed their wages,to the welfare of 
parents and siblings, and ceased their wage labor at marriage, and that 
the bulk of the nineteenth century increase in employment of women 
outside the home occurred through the expansion of non-factory occupations 
which had long employed female workers. They concede the concomitant rise 
and fall of both legitimate and illegitimate fertility and agree with 
Shorter in stressing the contribution of contraception to the decline. 
But they deny Shorter's calendar of attitudinal change and attribute the 
earlier rise in.fertility to short-run effects of proletarianization and 
of declining mortality. Reviewing the American evidence, Daniel Scott Smith 
(1973) rejects Shorter's calendar even more emphatically, minimizes the 
attitudinal changes involved in the last century's alterations in sexual 
behavior, and suggests that the most recent shifts continue a long series 
of swings up and down in both legitimate and illegitimate fertility. 
Three elements of Shorter's analysis do not, I think, stand up well 
to criticism: the hypothesis of a new, massive, irreversible diffusion 
of desires for individual gratification starting toward the end of the 
eighteenth century, the idea of a consequent general alteration of sexual 
behavior as traditional.constraints crumbled, and the explanation of 
fertility changes as a result of the new self-indulgence. But the debate 
is not closed. The concomitance of changes in legitimate and illegitimate 
fertility, as Shorter points out, challenges explanations which focus 
exclusively on changing family strategies. Likewise, the apparent gener- 
ality and rough simultaneity of both the rise and the fall in fertility 
throughout western Europe make it difficult to invoke the immediate effects 
of urbanization or industrialization, which proceeded at very different 
paces in different regions. My earlier discussion of proletarianization 
gives some reasons for seeking a major part of the explanation in the 
expansion and then the contraction of rural landless labor. Whether that 
is a false lead or not, checking it clearly belongs on the agenda of 
demographic history. 
The agenda includes. the.specification and localization of.the vital. 
changes to be explained. 1t.includes combing and collating the scattered 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century descriptions of sexual behavior and 
family life. It includes close study of differential patterns of change 
by occupation, industry, age, family status, wealth and locality. And 
it involves modeling the relationships to be expected if the hypothesis 
of a massive, effective ideological change is correct or if the major 
alternatives to that hypothesis are correct. 
Both this particular line of inquiry and the general problems in 
household economics discussed earlier lead to another two agenda items 
we have not yet discussed.directly: the determinants of household 
composition and the causes and effects of labor force participation by 
different members of the household. 
Household composition is problematic in more ways than one. First, 
the work in household economics generally depends on the assumption of 
collective decision-making by a household in terms of a single utility 
function. At a minimum, the presence or absence of aged parents, colla- 
teral relatives, numerous children, boarders, servants or multiple 
nuclear families within the same household should affect the shape of 
that utility function; with complex households, the assumption of a 
single collective decision-maker may work badly. What is more, household 
composition is a consequence of household decision-making: decisions to 
marry, to migrate, to have another child, to take on a hired hand, and so 
on. Thus decisions at one point in time will reshape the utility function 
for the next round of decisions. 
In addition, households often make deliberate changes in composition 
as an alternative to altering their fertility patterns or changing their 
patterns of consumption of goods and services . Some homely examples are 
sending babies out to nurse (and therefore, quite likely, to die), bringing 
in a hired hand when the farm family has a short supply of male workers, 
hiring out a youngster as a servant or an apprentice, doubling up with a 
sibling's family in times of hardship. All of these were common and 
crucial in some phases of European history. It may be possible to gener- 
alize the economic analysis of fertility into an analysis of,decisions 
concerning household composition. Otherwise, we shall have to graft a 
new set of arguments about the causes and effects of household composition 
onto the existing tree. 
Peter Laslett (1972) has recently held out hope of avoiding that 
complexity. He notes the statistical predominance in western countries of 
households consisting of no more than one nuclear family and no non-family 
members. Ansley Coale and others had already shown (e.g. in Coale et al. 
1965) that for compelling demographic and structural reasons the large 
"extended family" consisting of a couple, their children and their chil- 
dren's children was likely to be rare even where people held it up as an 
ideal. Their arguments did not rule out the possibility of compounding 
through the co-residence of married siblings, the employment of servants, 
the taking in of lodgers, and so on. Working mainly from nominal census 
lists, Laslett and collaborators laid out long runs of evidence for the 
rarity of these arrangements in England, France, Italy, the Balkans, the 
Low Countries and the United States. 
In an as-yet unpublished critique, however, Lutz Berkner shows that 
the evidence is not overwhelming: it is dubious whether the enumerations 
analyzed do distinguish households in a uniform and theoretically meaningful 
way, the statistical predominance of nuclear households at.any one point in 
time is quite compatible with arrangements in which households normally 
have a compound phase, and in any case the ethnographic accounts provided 
by Laslett's collaborators document the widespread existence of compound 
households. As Berkner-sums up: 
Despite their focus on the small nuclear family, what do these 
studies actually indicate about family structure in the past? 
First, that a large proportion of the households in many 
regions included an extended family phase. This is true in 
southern France, Tuscany, Corsica, and of course 
Serbia and Japan. Second, that there is a great deal of 
regional variation which can be explained by social and eco- 
nomic differences. In Tuscany, households were more complex 
in the rural villages than in the cities, in the Netherlands 
they were more complex on arable than livestock farms, and in 
Japan complexity and size reflected commercial isolation. 
Third, that the complexity and size of peasant households is 
directly related to their wealth. This is the case in rural 
Lancashire, Corsica, and Tuscany. Fourth, that inheritance 
and succession rules are crucial variables. They explain the 
high incidence of household complexity in Japan (through 
adoption) and Serbia, and might explain the difference between 
southern and northern France or between Holland and Overijssel 
(Berkner 1974: n.p.). 
It looks as though students of small-scale demographic processes will not 
be able to avoid dealing with household composition. 
The same goes for the causes and effects of labor force partici- 
pation by different members of the household. The problem is already on 
the agenda in the form of discussions of tradeoffs or conflicts between 
female employment and fertility. The general version of the problem 
concerns the disposition of the household's entire supply of labor. That 
includes the labor of children and old people. Following Chayanov, a 
number of students of the European peasantry have looked closely at the 
labor requirements of different types of farms, and have seen peasant 
households as carrying on a continual negotiation between.their own age- 
sex composition and the work to be done (see Thorner 1964, Wolf 1966). 
The demand for labor on most peasant holdings is inelastic. Over the 
longer run, goes the hypothesis I mentioned earlier, peasants.adjust their 
fertility to that demand.for labor. Peasants respond to short-run discrep- 
ancies between the supply and the demand on their.own holdings by farming 
out their own youngsters or taking in youngsters from other farms, by 
renting additional land or renting out land they cannot handle themselves, 
by hiring land-poor laborers, and so on. (In this volume, Berkner and 
Mendels, Braun and Wrigley all discuss different features of these 
" 
I 
adjustment processes.) The availability of piece-work and wage-work in 
rural industry and agriculture provide an a1ternative.m the tuning of 
household composition to the labor requirements of the individual holding; 
however, it also provides means and incentives for the departure of wage- 
earners from the household; 
Permanent employment outside the household and long-distance migration 
often begin as simple extengions of these local adjustment processes: a 
region of Switzerland comes to specialize in the supplying of mercenaries 
to European armies, and their remittances keep the family economy going; 
what was once a few years of domestic service before a girl married 
becomes a lifetime as a.maid, and so on. In another variant of the pro- 
cess, whole households come to be engaged in rural industry--first carding, 
spinning, weaving and so on within their own dwellings, then transferring 
the same division of labor into the early factories. The earliest promoters 
of "child labor," as Neil Smelser insisted some time ago, were the parents 
of the child laborers. They brought the children with them into the shop, 
received remuneration for the household as a team, and had to hire someone 
to fill the children's roles if they had no offspring of their own to do 
the job. 
Historically speaking, the problem of labor force partici- 
pation links directly to the problems of household composition and of 
proletarianization. In rural households, the connections between - 
employment opportunities for children and fertility seem at least as 
important as the connections between employment opportunities for married 
women and fertility. 
The current theoretical challenge in the study of small-scale vital 
processes is to see whether economic models such as those proposed by 
Nerlove and Easterlin can accomodate these new contingencies, or whether 
we shall require new models incorporating multiple utility schedules, 
I 
changing household composition, partially independent determination of 
sexual activity and fertility, varying loci of control over fertility, and 
multiple opportunities for employment of the household's labor supply. 
The Agenda 
The historical study of vital processes, it turns out, has an agenda 
which is rich, distinctive and significant. Parts of the agenda belong to 
demography as a whole; historical materials are simply a convenient source 
of data for them. That is true, I would say, of the decomposition of year- 
to-year vital changes into cohort, compositional and annual effects. Other 
parts of the agenda are of great interest to historians, but matter little 
to demography itself. Most of the components-of-growth analyses I discussed 
earlier fall into that category. Yet there is an important remainder: 
fundamental problems which are at once historical and demographic. The 
damaged theory of demographic transition will not be repaired without close 
analysis of long series of changes.in fertility and mortality. The extent , 
to which peasant populations are self-equilibrating--and, if the extent is 
large, how the equilibrating processes work--matters to western economic 
history as well as to contemporary analyses of population control. The 
related question of.whether proletarianization has a strong, consistent 
tendency to promote high rates of natural increase (and if so, how) applies 
to a wide range of situations both historical and contemporary. The tangled 
ties of population growth, labor supply, consumer demand and economic growth 
require sorting. How much, how effectively, and how out-migration, employ- 
ment in wage-labor, restrictions on marriage and control of fertility itself 
acted as alternatives to each other in the western historical experience 
deserves the closest demographic attention. Finally, it will take a great 
combination of historical and demographic expertise to determine.where, when 
and how the durable nineteenth-century.decline of fertility occurred in 
Europe and America: d i d  something c r u c i a l  happen i n  t h e  c i t i e s ?  Did the  
p r o l e t a r i a n s '  a c q u i s i t i o n  of proper ty  and of o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  mob i l i t y  
h e l p  them escape t h e  Malthusian t r a p ?  Did some s o r t  of a t t i t u d i n a l  
r evo lu t ion  r a p i d l y  r e v i s e  peop le ' s  approaches t o  s e x u a l i t y  and ch i ld-  
bear ing?  
These s t r i n g s  of provoca t ive  ques t ions  b r a i d  i n t o  two main s t r ands :  
1. I n  t h e  p a r t s  of t h e  world which a r e  new predominantly urban - 
and i n d u s t r i a l ,  by what demographic process  d i d  t h e  t r a n s f  ormation 
of  a n  a g r a r i a n  i n t o  a n  -urban- indus t r ia l  popula t ion  occur? 
2. What caused t h e  long-run changes i n  t h e  f e r t i l i t y  l e v e l  and i n  
t h e  de te rminants  of f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  f e r t i l i t y  w i t h i n  those  same 
a r e a s  ? 
Other ques t ions  concerning m o r t a l i t y ,  n u p t i a l i t y ,  migra t ion  and s o c i a l  
mob i l i t y  a r e  a l s o  worth ask ing .  Some of them come up i n e v i t a b l y  on t h e  
way t o  answering t h e  two master  ques t ions .  But t h e  gene ra l  i n q u i r i e s  
i n t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of urban- indus t r ia l  popula t ions  and the  de te rminants  
of f e r t i l i t y  changes w i l l  s u r e l y  dominate t h e  agenda f o r  some time t o  
come. 
I n  each case ,  we have two groups of t h e o r i e s  t o  choose from. The 
f i r s t  p o s t u l a t e s  a  sha rp  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  between t h e  o l d  system and t h e  
new one, and thereby r e q u i r e s  us t o  formula te  t h r e e  sub theo r i e s :  one 
concerning t h e  dynamics of t he  " t r a d i t i o n a l "  o r  "pre- indus t r ia l"  demo- 
graphic  system, another  concerning t h e  dynamics of t h e  "modern" o r  
" i n d u s t r i a l "  system, and a  t h i r d  concerning t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  between 
them. I n  t h e  case  of t h e  c r e a t i o n  of an  u rban - indus t r i a l  popula t ion ,  
.. . 
t h e  t y p i c a l  components a r e  a  model of t h e  labor  requirements  of an 
a g r a r i a n  economy, a  model of t h e  l abo r  requirements  of la rge-sca le  
i n d u s t r i a l  product ion,  and a  model of  a  modernizat ion process: d i f -  
fu s ion ,  c a p i t a l  accumulation, en t repreneursh ip ,  organizat . iona1 inno- 
va t ion ,  t echno log ica l  change i n  some combination o r  o t h e r .  I n  t h e  
c a s e  of f e r t i l i t y  change, t h e  t y p i c a l  components a r e  a  model of 
I I  n a t u r a l , "  " s o c i a l l y  control led1 '  o r  " t r a d i t i o n a l "  f e r t i l i t y  behavior ,  
a  model of "cont ro l led ,"  " ind iv idua l ly  con t ro l l ed"  o r  "modern" 
f e r t i l i t y  behavior  and a  model of t h e  process  by which one r ep laces  
t h e  o the r :  a  p r i m a r i l y  i d e o l o g i c a l  p roces s ,  a  p r imar i ly  t e c h n i c a l  
process ,  o r  something e l s e .  
The second group of t h e o r i e s  t r e a t  both long-run and short-run 
dynamics a s  outcomes of t h e  same fundamental r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  and there- 
by s t r e s s  t h e  c o n t i n u i t i e s  between p a s t  and p re sen t .  I n  t h e  case  of 
t h e  c r e a t i o n  of an urban- indus t r ia l  popula t ion ,  we .have ' t e c h n i c a l  
innovat ion ,  c a p i t a l  a c c a u l a t i o n ,  investment ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  t rans-  
formation and changes i n  popula t ion  composition a c c e l e r a t i n g  or  
d e c e l e r a t i n g  toge the r  a s  a  consequence e i t h e r  of t h e i r  own i n t e r n a l  
dynamics o r  a s  a  func t ion  of exogenous.changes i n  m o r t a l i t y ,  i n  
communications o r  i n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of proper ty  and p o l i t i c a l  con t ro l .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of f e r t i l i t y  change, we have i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  households 
maximizing i n  accordance wi th  a  s e t  of u t i l i t i e s  -which change very 
l i t t l e  and which a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  uniform from one group t o  another ,  
bu t  under c o n s t r a i n t s  which vary impor tan t ly  from popula t ion  t o  
popula t ion  and which s h i f t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  bo th  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run  and 
t h e  long. 
The choice  between d i s c o n t i n u i t y  t h e o r i e s  and c o n t i n u i t y  t h e o r i e s  
i s  f a m i l i a r .  Every problem of "modernization" o r  "development" poses 
t he  same choice .  It i s  not  merely a  ma t t e r  of emphasis; t h e  c~mpromise 
I 1  Some t h i n g s  change, wh i l e  o t h e r s  remain t h e  same," w i l l  no t  r e so lve  
i t .  What i s  a t  i s s u e  i s  no t  whether t h e  va lues  of c r u c i a l  v a r i a b l e s  
remain t h e  same, bu t  whether t he  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among v a r i a b l e s  change 
so  r a d i c a l l y  from one domain t o  ano the r  t h a t  we need a  new theory  f o r  
each domain. Advocates of c o n t i n u i t y  t h e o r i e s  tend t o  t r e a t  t h i s  a s  
p a r t l y  a n  empi r i ca l  ques t ion  (how w e l l  does a  model which ope ra t e s  
e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  one domain work i n  t h e  next?)  and p a r t l y  a  ques t ion  
of  convenience ( a t  what l e v e l  of g e n e r a l i t y  i s  i t  c u r r e n t l y  e a s i e s t  
and/or most e f f e c t i v e  t o  a rgue?) ;  they hope t o  subsume t h e  b e s t  s t a g e  
formula t ions  i n t o  t h e i r  own gene ra l  models. Advocates of d i scont in-  
u i t y  t h e o r i e s  tend t o  consider  proposed gene ra l  models a s  much more 
bound t o  t h e i r  t imes and p l aces  o r  o r i g i n  than  t h e i r  advocates admit,  
and t o  a t t a c k  t h e  f i t  of t h e i r  assumptions,  t h e i r  c a t e g o r i e s  and t h e i r  
empi r i ca l  imp l i ca t ions  i n  t h e  new domain; Karl  Polanyi ,  f o r  example, 
argued long and hard t h a t  th'e market was a h i s t o r i c a l l y  s p e c i f i c  
development, t h a t  economic t h e o r i e s  b u i l t  around market mechanisms 
could not  and d id  not  f i t  most a g r a r i a n  economies. 
A s  i s  probably obvious i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  d i scuss ion ,  my own sym- 
p a t h i e s  l i e  w i th  the  a t tempt  t o  b u i l d  gene ra l  models. Nevertheless ,  
I would l i k e  t o  s e e  models which t ake  t ime i t s e l f  s e r i o u s l y .  I n  
genera l ,  I mean models i n  which what has  happened b e f o r e  c o n s t r a i n s  
what happens next .  Developmental models which po r t r ay  e s s e n t i a l l y  
t he  same s e t  of changes a s  r e c u r r i n g  i n  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same manner 
w i t h i n  popula t ion  a f t e r  popula t ion  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n  by t r e a t -  
i n g  each case  a s  more.or  l e s s  autonomous. The formation of n a t i o n a l  
s t a t e s  ( t o  t ake  an  example o u t s i d e  t h e  p re sen t  d i scuss ion )  was an  
h i s t o r i c a l l y  s p e c i f i c  process  which began 5n e a r n e s t  i n  western. 
Europe some,t ime around 1500, which l e a d  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  s t a t e -  
system encompassing almost  t h e  e n t i r e  world by t h e  middle of t h e  
twent ie th  century ,  i n  which t h e  s t a t e s  i n  ex i s t ence  a t  any given poin t  
i n  t he  process  s t r o n g l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  s tatemaking a c t i v i t i e s  and out- 
comes of t h e  newcomers a t  t h a t  p o i n t  . i n  time, and i n  which t h e  s t a t e s  
and p r o t o s t a t e s  involved cont inuous ly  shaped each o t h e r  through war, 
diplomacy and economic a c t i v i t y .  Yet we have abundant t h e o r i e s  of 
p o l i t i c a l  development which propose a  r e c u r r e n t  process  happening 
( o r  f a i l i n g  t o  happen) i n  country a f t e r  country more o r  l e s s  autono- 
mously. The same confusion p r e v a i l s  about cap i t a l i sm:  an h i s t o r i -  
c a l l y - s p e c i f i c  system of proper ty  r e l a t i o n s  which l i kewise  o r i g i n a t e d  
i n  Europe and l i k e w i s e  came t o  dominate . the e n t i r e  world. It makes 
r . e l a t i ve ly  l i t t l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  s ense  t o  l a b e l  some c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  
contemporary world a s  c a p i t a l i s t  and o t h e r s  a s  non-cap i t a l i s t  when a l l  
a r e  embedded i n  an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system i n  which t h e  market s e t s  t he  
p r i c e  f o r  a l l  t h e  f a c t o r s  of product ion.  It makes almost  no sense  a t  
a l l  t o  ana lyze  t h e  development of c a p i t a l i s m  country by country a s  i f  
i t  were a  s tandard ,  r e c u r r e n t ,  autonomous process .  In s t ead  of devel- 
opmental t h e o r i e s ,  i n  t h i s  sense  of t h e  word, we need h i s t o r i c a l  
t heo r i e s :  t h e o r i e s  which r e l a t e  t h e  experience of any p a r t i c u l a r  
popu la t ion  t o  h i s t o r i c a l l y  s p e c i f i c  processes  involv ing  a  number of 
d i f f e r e n t  popula t ions  a t  t h e  same time. 
The i n c l u s i o n  o r  exc lus ion  of t ime m a t t e r s  because i t  a f f e c t s  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of our  g e n e r a l i z i n g  from h i s t o r i c a l  s t u d i e s .  Where a  well-  
def ined  and se l f -conta ined  developmental process  a c t u a l l y  does e x i s t ,  
on t h e  analogy t o  t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  of an  organism, we can convenient ly 
neg lec t  time, and p r e d i c t  o r  even promote t h e  r ecu r rence  of t h a t  same 
process  i n  a  new s e t t i n g .  That has  been a  s u s t a i n i n g  hope of develop- 
ment t h e o r i s t s  i n  economics, soc io logy  and p o l i t i c s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
a  process  i s  l a r g e r  t han  any p a r t i c u l a r  popula t ion  we may c a r e  t o  
ana lyze  and/or  i s  changing s i g n i f i c a n t l y  over  t ime, t h e  analogy from 
p a s t  t o  p r e s e n t  w i l l  b e  f a u l t y .  That does no.t mean t h e r e  is no way t o  
g e n e r a l i z e  from t h e  p a s t ;  i t  means t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  w i l l  have t o  
i nc lude  an  adjustment  fo r .  t h e  t ime of i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  and may have t o  
i nc lude  s p e c i f i c  a l lowances f o r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  popula t ion  
i n  ques t ion  and t h e  r e s t  of t he  world. 
How does my polemic apply t o  h i s t o r i c a l  s t u d i e s  of changing 
f e r t i l i t y ?  Mainly by warning a g a i n s t  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  d e r i v e  a  s tandard  
sequence f o r  t h e  demographic t r a n s i t i o n  from t h e  exper iences  of 
s i n g l e  wes tern  c o u n t r i e s  and t o  apply i t  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  poor coun- 
t r i e s  of  today ' s  world, by drawing a t t e n t i o n  t o  such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a s  
t h a t  p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n  is  p lay ing  a  l a r g e r  and l a r g e r  p a r t  i n  t h e  
whole wor ld ' s  popula t ion  processes  a s  t he  economic interdependence of 
d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of t h e  world i n c r e a s e s ,  and by sugges t ing  t h a t  t h e  
form and e x t e n t  of a  popu la t ion ' s  dependence on o t h e r s  should become 
major variables in our models of urban-industrial transformation as 
well as our models of fertility change. In short, by.giving preference 
to continuity theories, but with time built in. 
The authors in.this volume have no obligation to honor my prefer- 
ence. In fact, they vary considerably in their theoretical preferences. 
Consider the contrast between a continuity theorist such as Ronald Lee, 
who aspires to capture the entire evolution of the English population in 
a single set of equations, and a discontinuity theorist such as Rudolf 
Braun, who insists on the cultural distinctions of a Swiss world of pre- 
industrial times whose regularities the expansion of industry simply 
swept away. Compare Easterlin's portrayal of households maximizing under 
changing constraints with van de Wallets stress on the diffusion of new 
ideas and information. The purpose of my long commentary on the existing 
literature has been to pace out the space and help the reader see where 
my collaborators stand within it, not to herd them all into the same corner 
of the space. 
We have arranged our papers in a rough descending order of generality. 
We begin with Richard Easterlin's synthesis of economic and sociological 
ideas about fertility. The treatment is abstract, the scope the entire 
world. E .A. Wrigley ' s "Fertility Strategy for the Individual and the Group" 
discusses the impact of different mortality schedules on the survival of 
households or communities exhibiting various patterns of fertility: He 
concerns himself .mainly with pre-industrial European.populations, but 
explores in general terms in what sense such populations could be, and were, 
self-regulating. Lutz Berkner and Franklin Mendels undertake the systematic 
- - 
analysis of a problem which has .produced a good deal'of folklore, but few 
clear results: the relationship among the system of inheritance, the 
composition of households and the patterns of nuptiality and fertility 
in-western Europe before the twenti.eth century. In particular, they try 
to determine whether the inheritance system--especially the distinction 
between.partibility and impartibility--has an independent effect on demo-. 
graphic patterns. Ronald Lee fashions a series of.economic models of.the 
determinants of temporal fluctuations in vital rates. He estimates the 
models by means of long series from England before the nineteenth century, 
using techniques ranging from simple regression to spectral analysis. The 
paper by Etienne van de Walle reports some of the findings of a massive 
region-by-region'study of fertility changes in nineteenth-century France. 
More so than in other reports of the study, van de Walle examines (and 
makes preliminary tests of) arguments concerning the diffusion of contra- 
ceptive practice in France. In his "Multivariate Regression Analysis of 
Fertility Differentials among Massachusetts Towns and Regions in 1860," 
Maris Vinovskis actually presents a substantial discussion of vital trends 
in New England during the first half of the nineteenth century as well as 
the large cross-sectional analysis promised by the title. Using the. 
fertility ratio as the primary dependent variable, Vinovskis alternates 
between establishing the strength of regional variations and measuring the 
relationships between his fertility indexes and a number of characteristics 
of the local population. Finally, Rudolf Braun draws on his long historical 
studies of the transformation of Zurich's hinterland as cottage industry 
rose and fell. In this essay, he emphasizes the contrasting demographic 
behavior of rural households in agriculture and in industry, and sketches 
the demographic mechanisms by which the industrial population increased. 
I take up the contents and implications of the seven papers in this 
book's conclusion. Here I want simply to forecast some of their common 
themes. 
As compared with the existing literature and as compared with the agenda 
this group set for itself at the beginning of the inquiry, the papers 
attribute relatively little importance to industrialization as such. That 
is partly because of their concentration on "pre-industrial1' populations. 
(The word is misleading because of the extensive small-scale manufacturing 
which went on in rural Europe before the nineteenth century.) It is partly 
because much of their work goes into inserting other variables--especially 
demographic variables--in-between industrialization and fertility change. 
But it also reflects a growing doubt that exposure to large-scale manufac- 
turing and its concomitants.reliably transforms the patterns of nuptiality 
and fertility in the populations involved. 
On the demographic side, our inquiries increased our appreciation of 
the effects of changing mortality. The theoretical discussions (for example, 
in the papers by Wrigley or Berkner and Mendels) stress the importance both 
of the turnover in adult positions due to mortality and of the highly 
variable life .expectancy of children. The empirical analyses (e.g. in Lee 
and van de Walle) consistently reveal strong associations between levels of 
fertility and mortality. In compensation, several of the studies (notably 
Lee's) question whether variations in opportunities to marry acted as quite 
the regulator of fertility that Malthus and many after him have thought. In 
pre-industrial.and industrial populations alike, fertility regulation within 
marriage comes out as the primary adjustment mechanism. 
That line of inquiry leads a.number of the papers back to the hypothesis 
of an unconscious collective rationality .which roughly matched the procreative 
tendencies of pre-industrial populations to the carrying capacities of their. 
environments. Not that the system was.gentle: in all our portraits, it 
depended on life expectancies at birth of less than forty years. In several 
of the analyses, it was compatible with long periods of.declining real wages. 
And our general arguments make the system vulnerable to the increasing 
dependency of the local population on employment governed by demand in dis- 
tant markets. Nevertheless, a picture of self-regulation short,of utter 
misery emerges from our varied explorations of the agrarian West. By impli- 
cation, our findings give grounds for both optimism and pessimism about the 
population problems of the contemporary world. Cautious optimism: we end 
up with some confidence in the capacity of human populations to regulate 
themselves. Pessimism: we.end up doubting that the high fertility of the 
Third World results from the fact that its populations have not yet begun 
to restrict blrths--but will somehow begin to do so automatically as moderni- 
zation proceeds. 
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Since the bibliography of this paper is fifty pages long, I have decided 
to omit it from this version and to circulate it separately. 

